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Abstract
This paper analyzes the political economy of public education and in-cash trans-
fer in an overlapping generations model of a two-class society in which the dynamics
of inequality is driven by the accumulation of human capital. The two redistributive
policies are determined by voting, while private education that supplements public
education is purchased individually. The model, which includes two-dimensional
voting, demonstrates either of the following two types of stable steady-state equilib-
ria, which are in line with the evidence: a high-inequality equilibrium with govern-
ment expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer, or a low-inequality equilibrium with
that favoring public education.
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1 Introduction
In most developed countries, redistribution is carried out through in-kind transfer pro-
grams such as public education for successive generations, as well as through in-cash
transfer programs such as social security and welfare budgets within the current genera-
tion. The size and the composition of redistributive policies in democratic countries are
determined via voting, and redistributive expenditures a¤ect human capital formation
and thus the next generations income distribution, which in turn have an e¤ect on fu-
ture voting over in-cash and in-kind redistribution programs. Therefore, it is natural to
expect some correlation between inequality and the size and composition of redistributive
expenditures.
Figure 1 illustrates a scatter plot of the Gini index and the ratio of in-cash transfer
to public education expenditure in OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development) countries. The gure shows a positive correlation between inequality and
the ratio. High-inequality countries are associated with a large share of in-cash transfer
in government expenditure, whereas low-inequality countries are associated with a large
share of public education in government expenditure. The aim of this study is to develop
a model that explains this cross-country di¤erence, and to clarify the role of private
education and family backgrounds in policymaking tackling inequality and redistribution.
[Figure 1 here.]
For the purpose of analysis, we use the framework in which Gradstein and Justman
(1996) investigate the role of private education as an alternative to public education.
The present model di¤ers from theirs in the following two aspects. First, Gradstein and
Justman (1996) consider public education as only a means of redistribution, while the
present model allows for in-cash, lump-sum transfer as an alternative to public education.
The presence of lump-sum transfer might incentivize some agents to prefer lump-sum
transfer to public education, and to make use of the transfer benets for private education
for their children.
Second, Gradstein and Justman (1996) assume that the marginal productivity of edu-
cation is constant, while the present model assumes that it is dependent on human capital.
In particular, the present paper assumes that the marginal productivity of private educa-
tion increases with the parentshuman capital level. This assumption reects the family
background e¤ect: educated parents can provide their children a better environment for
learning (Gertler and Glewwe, 1990).
The present model, which includes the above two aspects, works as follows. There
are two types of family dynasties classied according to their endowed level of human
capital: low and high. An agent in each type of family enters adulthood with a stock
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of human capital invested by his/her parents, earns after-tax labor income, and receives
lump-sum transfer benets form the government. He/she decides the allocation of the
disposable income between current consumption and private investment in his/her childs
further education. The private educational investment combined with public education
determines his/her childs human capital level, which determines the childs income.
Every adult agent votes over the tax rate as well as the allocation of tax revenue
between public education and lump-sum transfer. Given the bidimensional issue space,
the Nash equilibrium of a majority voting game may fail to exist. To deal with this,
we use the concept of issue-by-issue voting, that is, the notion of a structure-induced
Nash equilibrium voting game formalized by Shepsle (1979) and applied by Conde-Ruiz
and Galasso (2003, 2005) for the framework of overlapping generations. Throughout the
paper, the low-type individuals are the majority in the economy. We compute the low-
types preferred allocation for a given tax rate and his/her preferred tax rate for a given
allocation, and nd the point where these two reaction functions cross.
Based on the notion of structure-induced Nash equilibrium voting, we rst focus on
some period t and demonstrate the period-t political equilibrium outcome for a given
inequality level. When inequality is low, the economy attains an equilibrium with govern-
ment expenditure favoring public education. The low-type individuals, as the majority,
prefer public education to lump-sum transfer because their income is not far from the
average and they have a certain level of income. When inequality is high, the economy
attains an equilibrium with government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer. The
low-type individuals feel the need for support via lump-sum transfer to compensate for
their low income.
The characterization of the period-t political equilibrium enables us to show the e¤ect
of inequality on redistribution policy, but not the mutual interaction between inequality
and redistribution policy. To illustrate the interaction, we analyze the dynamics of in-
equality and redistribution policies across periods, and show that the family backgrounds
do a¤ect the joint determination of inequality and redistribution policy. In particular,
we show that the economy with weaker family background e¤ect attains a more equal
state with government expenditure favoring public education, and that the economy with
the stronger family background e¤ect attains a less equal state with government expen-
diture favoring lump-sum transfer. The result provides one possible explanation for the
cross-country di¤erence in inequality and redistribution policy observed in Figure 1.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. We rst present a literature review. There-
after, Section 2 sets up the model and characterizes an economic equilibrium. Section 3
considers voting behavior of agents and characterizes political equilibria in each period.
Sections 4 shows the existence and stability of a steady-state equilibrium, and claries
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the role of family backgrounds in the joint determination of inequality and redistribution
policy. Section 5 checks the robustness of the result under alternative assumptions. Some
proofs are relegated to Appendix.
1.1 Literature Review
In the recent decades, there has been an increasing amount of literature on the political
economy of inequality and redistribution (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000 and Borck,
2007, for a survey). However, most of these focus on either redistribution in cash through
lump-sum transfer (e.g., Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Alesina
and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Benabou, 2000) or redistribution in kind
through public education (e.g., Stiglitz, 1974; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992, 1996, 1998,
2001; Epple and Romano, 1996; Gradstein and Justman, 1996, 1997; Hoyt and Lee,
1998; Cardak, 2004; Glomm, 2004; Bearse, Glomm, and Patterson, 2005; de la Croix and
Doepke, 2009). These studies do not demonstrate the e¤ect of current income inequality
on the allocation of tax revenue between the two types of redistribution via voting, and
that of the allocation on the inequality within the next generation through human capital
accumulation.
Some recent studies provide partial answers to the above questions. Bearse, Glomm,
and Janeba (2001) and Creedy and Moslehi (2009) consider an alternative to lump-sum
transfer, namely, public education (Bearse, Glomm and Janeba, 2001) and public goods
provision (Creedy and Moslehi, 2009). They consider voting on the composition of gov-
ernment expenditure, and successfully demonstrate how the composition is a¤ected by
inequality of voters. However, in their models, the tax rate is considered exogenous to
ensure voting over one dimension. In addition, there is no dynamic interaction between
inequality and redistributive policy because pre-tax income distribution is exogenously
given in their static frameworks.
Bernasconi and Profeta (2012) overcome the limitations in the above mentioned studies
by developing a two-period overlapping generations model of a two-class society with
human capital accumulation. They consider probabilistic voting over public education
and lump-sum transfer within a generation. However, private education as an alternative
to public education, which occurs to a signicant extent in many developed countries
(OECD, 2013), is exempted from their analysis, because their focus is on the role of
public education as a device to provide for recognizing the talent of poor-born children.1
The literature review thus far suggests that the following questions remain unresolved.
How do the politics of public education and lump-sum transfer a¤ect economic decision
1Arcalean and Schiopu (2010) study the interaction between public and private education expenditure.
However, they abstract away from voting and consider education policy as given. Their focus is on the
e¤ect of change in education policy on human capital accumulation and growth.
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over private education of agents? How does the decision in turn a¤ect the inequality
among agents and their preferences over the size and the composition of redistributive ex-
penditures? What are the dynamic, long-run consequences of this interaction for inequal-
ity and redistributive policy? What causes the di¤erence in inequality and redistribution
policy across countries? The contribution of this paper is to answer these unresolved
issues in the previous studies, and to show that private education and family background
play crucial roles in answering these issues.
2 The Model and Economic Equilibrium
We consider a discrete-time overlapping generations economy that starts at time 0. The
economy is populated by two types of family dynasties, indexed by i 2 fL;Hg; of agents
who live in two periods, youth and adulthood. A type-i adult agent in period 0 is endowed
with hi0 units of human capital, where 0 < h
L
0 < h
H
0 . Thus, period-0 type-L and type-H
agents are endowed with low and high human capital, respectively.
Each adult agent produces one o¤spring; hence, the population remains constant in
every generation. The fraction of type-i agents within each generation is given by i 2
(0; 1), where i is constant across generations and satises 0 < H < 0:5 < L < 1 withP
i 
i = 1. The assumption implies that in every period, type-L agents are the majority
in the economy. This assumption reects the right-skewed income distribution in the real
world. In Section 5, we undertake a brief analysis of an alternative case where the type-H
agents are the majority in the economy.
2.1 Preferences and Budget Constraints
A type-i adult agent at time t is endowed at the time he/she enters adulthood with a stock
of human capital hit, which also denes his/her e¤ective labor capacity. He/she receives a
lump-sum transfer from the government, bt. Given the income tax t and the transfer bt,
a type-i adult decides the allocation of disposable income between current consumption,
cit, and private investment in his/her childs further education, z
i
t, subject to the budget
constraint,
cit + z
i
t  (1  t)hit + bt:
A type-i adult of generation t derives utility from current consumption, cit, and from
his/her childs anticipated future income, hit+1. A type is preferences are specied by
the following utility function
uit = (1  ) ln cit +  lnhit+1;
where  2 (0; 1) is a common parameter reecting the bequest motive. A higher  implies a
greater incentive for educational investment. We employ this logarithmic utility function
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for tractability of analysis. In Section 5, it is shown that the result is qualitatively
unchanged when we employ a constant elasticity-of-substitution utility function.
2.2 Human Capital Formation
The level of o¤springs education, hit+1, is determined by public schooling, et, as well
as by privately purchased supplementary education, zit. We assume that the individual
level of education is determined by the human capital production function, hit+1 = A
i  
ht

et + (h
i
t)

zit

, or
hit+1 = A
i
 
ht
  et +  it zit ;
where
ht  LhLt + HhHt and it 
hit
ht
:
The variable ht denotes the average human capital in period t, and the variable it denotes
the ratio of type-is human capital to the average human capital. The parameters Ai and
 are assumed to satisfy Ai > 0 and  2 (0; 1). The term et + (it) zit is the sum of the
e¤ective public and private educational investments.
The function above has the following two features. First, the marginal productivity
of public education depends on the average human capital representing, for example, the
quality of teachers in public schools (de la Croix and Doepke, 2004). On the other hand,
the marginal productivity of private education depends on the parentshuman capital
level, implying thateducated parents can provide an environment conductive to better
learning, such as directly helping children with schoolwork, which will also raise the human
capital received per year by the child(Gertler and Glewwe, 1990). This feature is further
discussed in Section 5.
Second, the parameter Ai(> 0) represents a durable productive asset handed from
generation to generation, such as genetic ability, technology transfer, and business succes-
sion (Gradstein and Justman, 1996). The distribution of Ai is assumed to be stationary
over time and to be positively correlated to human capital, hit
AH = A > 0 and AL = A where  2 (0; 1):
This assumption implies that on average, children born in higher-income families are en-
dowed with a higher productivity of human capital, and thus, a higher learning technology
(see, e.g., Huggett, Ventura and Yaron, 2006).2
2A possible extension is to assume that children have the same genetic ability with a probability q.
For example, children born in higher-income families have high genetic ability, AH , with a probability q,
while they have low genetic ability, AL, with a probability 1  q. Bernasconi and Profeta (2012) assume
that this genetic probability of talent transmission, q, is not generally known in public, thereby resulting
in the talent mismatch. The current paper abstracts away from the talent transmission and mismatch;
instead, it focuses on the interaction between public and private education choice.
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2.3 Government Budget Constraint
In each period, the government raises tax revenue to nance the provision of uniform
public schooling for all children, et, as well as lump-sum transfer, bt: The fraction t 2 [0; 1]
of the tax revenue is devoted to lump-sum transfer; the rest is devoted to public schooling.
Thus, the government budget constraint is given by
bt = t(1  t)tht;
et = (1  t)(1  t)tht;
where the term ht is the average human capital in period t, which is equivalent to the
aggregate income in that period. The term (1  t) denotes the distortionary factor that
represents e¢ ciency loss of taxation. This assumption, which is common in the political
economy literature (see, e.g., Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2004; Conde-Ruiz and Profeta,
2007; Bethencourt and Galasso, 2008), is solely to ensure an interior solution to preferred
tax rates and otherwise plays no role.
The timing of events in period t is as follows. First, adult agents vote on the tax
rate t as well as the fraction of tax revenue devoted to lump-sum transfer t by majority
vote. Second, subject to the budget constraint, each agent decides on the allocation of
disposable income between consumption and private education. We solve the model by
backward induction.
2.4 Economic Equilibrium
Given a sequence of tax rates and the sizes of redistribution and public education,
ft; bt; etg1t=0, an economic equilibrium is a sequence of allocations, fzit; cit; hitgt=0;:::;1i=L;H with
the initial condition hi0 (i = L;H), such that (i) in every period, a type-i agent maxi-
mizes his/her utility subject to the budget constraint and the non-negativity constraint
of investment in private education and (ii) the government budget is balanced in every
period.
Recall that it  hit=ht(i = L;H) denotes the ratio of type-is private human capital
to the average human capital. By denition, the relation of hLt < ht < h
H
t holds for all t,
and thus, it(i = L;H) satises the following property:
0 < Lt 
hLt
ht
< 1 < Ht 
hHt
ht
:
The variable Lt , on which we will focus in the following sections, captures the extent of
income inequality in the economy; a higher Lt implies less inequality.
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The utility maximization problem of a type-i agent in period t is as follows:
max
zit2[0;(1 t)hit+bt]
(1  ) ln cit +  lnhit+1
subject to
cit + z
i
t  (1  t)hit + bt;
hit+1 = A
i
 
ht
  et +  it zit ;
given t; hit; 
i
t; bt; et and ht:
Solving the utility maximization problem of a type-i agent leads to the following
private education decision:
zit = max

0; 

(1  t)hit + bt
	  1  
(it)
 et

: (1)
Equation (1) states that the investment decision depends on an adults human capital hit
as well as government policy variables, t, bt and et. In particular, an agent chooses to
invest in private education if his/her human capital is high, the tax rate is low, the size
of redistribution is large, and/or the level of public education is low; otherwise, he/she
chooses no private investment in education and consumes all of his/her disposable income.
With the use of (1) and the budget constraint, we can write the consumption function
as
cit = min

(1  t)hit + bt; (1  ) 

(1  t)hit + bt +
et
(it)


:
The sum of the e¤ective public and private educational investments, et+(it)

zit, becomes
et +
 
it

zit = max

et;  

et +
 
it
 
(1  t)hit + bt
		
:
The utility obtained by agents in economic equilibrium is represented by their indirect
utility functions. We use the above mentioned investment and consumption functions to
obtain an indirect utility function of a type-i agent as follows:
V it =
8<: V it;z>0  ln

(1  t)hit + bt + et(it)

+ (1  ) ln(1  ) +  lnAi  ht  (it) if zit > 0;
V it;z=0  (1  ) ln [(1  t)hit + bt] +  lnAi
 
ht

et if zit = 0;
where V it;z>0 denotes the indirect utility of a type-i agent when he/she invests some portion
of his/her income in private education, and V it;z=0 denotes the indirect utility when he/she
does not invest in private education.
With the use of the government budget constraints bt = t(1   t)tht and et =
(1  t)(1  t)tht, we can rewrite the condition that determines investment decisions as
follows:
zit > 0, t >

1  

 1
(it)
   
i
t
t



1 +
1  

 1
(it)

 1
: (2)
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This inequality condition is more likely to be satised as the tax rate t is lower and the
share of redistribution in government expenditure t is higher. A lower tax rate and a
higher share of redistribution in government expenditure produce a larger income e¤ect,
thereby giving an agent an incentive to invest in private education.
With the use of condition (2) and the government budget constraints, we can write
the indirect utility function in terms of the tax rate t and the fraction t as follows:
V it =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
V it;z>0  ln (1  t)

it + tt +
1
(it)
 (1  t) t

+XZ>0
 
ht; 
i
t

if t >

1 

 1
(it)
   itt



1 + 1 

 1
(it)

 1
;
V it;z=0  ln(1  t) + (1  ) ln (it + tt) +  ln (1  t) t +XZ=0
 
ht; 
i
t

if t 

1 

 1
(it)
   itt



1 + 1 

 1
(it)

 1
;
(3)
where XZ>0
 
ht; 
i
t

and XZ=0
 
ht; 
i
t

are the terms unrelated to political decisions and
dened as follows:
XZ>0
 
ht; 
i
t
  ln ht + (1  ) ln(1  ) +  lnAi  ht   it ;
XZ=0
 
ht; 
i
t
  (1  ) ln ht +  lnAi  ht+1 :
3 Period t Political Equilibrium
In each period t, the tax rate t and the proportion t are determined by period-t adult
agents through a political process of majority voting. Type-L and type-H adult agents
cast a ballot over t; the income tax rate, and t, the share of lump-sum transfer in
government expenditure. Individual preferences over the two issues are represented by
the indirect utility function in (3) for i = L;H. Every agent has zero mass, and thus, no
individual vote can change the outcome of the election. Therefore, we assume that agents
vote sincerely.
The current majority voting game is characterized by a bidimensional issue space, 
and . Thus, a Nash equilibrium may not exist within the majority voting game. To
deal with this, we use the concept of issue-by-issue voting, or the structure-induced Nash
equilibrium, as formalized by Shepsle (1979) and applied by Conde-Ruiz and Galasso
(2003, 2005) to the framework of overlapping generations. Under the concept of the
structure-induced Nash equilibrium, a su¢ cient condition for ( t ; 

t ) to be a period-t
political equilibrium of the voting game is that  t represents the outcome of majority
voting over t when the other dimension is xed at its level t , and vice versa, provided
that preferences are single peaked along every dimension of the issue space.3
3Probabilistic voting is also useful to demonstrate two-dimensional voting (see, e.g., Persson and
8
Under the current framework, type-L agents are the majority for each issue, and the
preferences of type-L agents, specied in Eq. (3), are singled-peaked for each issue. We
can apply the concept of the structure-induced Nash equilibrium to the current framework.
Let Lt () denote type-Ls most preferred share as a function of the tax rate t, and let
Lt () denote type-Ls most preferred tax rate as a function of t. The point where
these two reaction functions cross corresponds to the structure-induced Nash equilibrium
outcome of the voting game. Given the assumption that type-L agents are the majority
for each issue, we investigate two cases, a case of zLt > 0 and a case of z
L
t = 0, respectively.
3.1 Type-Ls Preferred Policy When zLt > 0
Suppose that the type-L agent invests a part of his/her income in education. The condition
zLt > 0 in (2) is rewritten in terms of 
L
t as follows:
zLt > 0, t >

1  

 1
(Lt )
   
L
t
t



1 +
1  

 1
(Lt )

 1
: (4)
Under the condition in (4), the type-L agent, as a decisive voter, chooses t to maximize
his/her indirect utility, V Lt;z>0.
The rst derivative of V Lt;z>0 with respect to t is
@V Lt;z>0
@t
=
 1
1  t +
t + (1  t)=
 
Lt

t + tt + (1  t)t= (Lt )
:
The rst term on the right-hand side shows the marginal cost of taxation; the second term
shows the marginal benet of taxation. The above equation indicates that the marginal
cost is independent of the share of redistribution in government expenditure, t, while the
marginal benet is increasing in t. Therefore, there is a critical value of t, and type L
agents will nd it optimal to bear no tax burden when t is below this critical value, while
they nd it optimal to bear some tax burden when t is above the critical value. The
optimal choice of t by type-L agents is summarized as follows:
t = 
L
z>0(t)  max
(
0;
1
2

 
1 
 
Lt
1+
1  t 
 
1  (Lt )
!) ; (5)
where the superscript and the subscript in Lz>0() denote the type-L and zLt > 0; respec-
tively.
Next, consider the choice of t by type L agents when zLt > 0. As we can see in
Eq. (3), a marginal increase in t results in an increase in redistribution by (1   t)t
units, whereas it results in a decrease in public education by (1  t)t=
 
Lt

units. The
Tabellini, 2000). The present study employs issue-by-issue voting rather than probabilistic voting because
analytical solutions of the present model are not available in the latter voting approach.
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net benets are positive or negative depending on the relative magnitude between them.
That is,
@V Lt;z>0
@t
? 0 if and only if Lt ? 1;
where Lt < 1 always holds. Therefore, the type-Ls choice of t when z
L
t > 0 is given by
t = 
L
z>0(t)  0:
[Figure 2 here.]
The period-t political equilibrium when zLt > 0 is the point where the two reaction
functions, t = Lz>0(t) and t = 
L
z>0(t), cross as demonstrated in Figure 2. Substituting
t = 
L
z>0(t)  0 into t = Lz>0(t) in (5), we can compute the period-t equilibrium
policy when zLt > 0 as (t; t) =

1
2

1   Lt 1+ ; 0. We substitute the policy into
the condition zLt > 0 in (4) to nd the range of 
L
t that is consistent with the condition
zLt > 0 as 
L
t >
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)
. We can also nd that zHt > 0 holds in the current equilibrium
because zHt > z
L
t always holds by the denition of 
L
t . The analysis thus far is summarized
in the following lemma.
 Lemma 1. There exists a period-t political equilibrium with zLt > 0 and zHt > 0 if
Lt 2
 
1  
1 + 
1=(1+)
; 1
!
:
The corresponding policy is
(t; t) =

1
2

1   Lt 1+ ; 0 :
The condition in Lemma 1, Lt 2
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)
; 1

, determines the investment decision
by the type-L agents. The condition says that the type-Ls income is not far from the
average. They have a certain level of income and thus can a¤ord to invest in private
education. However, they feel the need for public support toward education because the
marginal productivity of public education is higher than that of the private education
nanced by the lump-sum transfer. Therefore, they prefer public education to lump-sum
transfer and thus want to nance education both privately and publicly.
3.2 Type-Ls Preferred Policy When zLt = 0
Suppose that the type-L agent does not invest in private education: zLt = 0. The condition
zLt = 0 in terms of 
L
t is
zLt = 0, t 

1  

 1
(Lt )
   
L
t
t



1 +
1  

 1
(Lt )

 1
: (6)
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Under the condition in (6), the type-L agent, as a decisive voter, chooses t to maximize
his/her indirect utility V Lt;z=0.
The rst derivative of V Lt;z=0 with respect to t is
@V Lt;z=0
@t
=
 1
1  t + (1  ) 
t
Lt + tt
+

t
:
The rst term on the right-hand side shows the marginal cost of taxation; the second term
shows the marginal benet of taxation via redistribution; and the third terms shows the
marginal benet of taxation via public education. Corner solutions, t = 0 and 1, are not
optimal for type L agents because @V Lt;z=0=@t

t=0
= +1 > 0 and @V Lt;z=0=@t

t=1
=
 1 < 0 hold. Thus, the optimal solution satises @V Lt;z=0=@t = 0, which results in
t = 
L
z=0(t), t =
(1 + )  =t
1  2t 
L
t :
Next, consider the choice of t by the type L agents when they do not invest in
private education, zLt = 0. The rst derivative of V
L
t;z=0 with respect to t is
@V Lt;z=0
@t
= (1  )  t
Lt + tt
  
1  t :
The rst term on the right-hand side shows the marginal benet from an increase in
redistribution, and the second term shows the marginal cost from a decrease in spending
on public education. When the tax rate t is low, the latter e¤ect overcomes the former
one; type L agents prefer no redistribution, t = 0. However, when the tax rate is high,
the two opposing e¤ects are o¤set at some level of t 2 (0; 1). In this case, the optimal
share satises @V Lt;z=0=@t = 0. Therefore, the preferred share t for type L agents is
summarized as
t = 
L
z=0(t)  max

0; (1  )  
L
t
t

:
[Figure 3 about here.]
The two reaction functions, t = Lz=0(t) and t = 
L
z=0(t), are illustrated in Figure
3. The crossing points of the two reaction functions may correspond to the period-t
structure-induced Nash equilibrium of the voting game when zLt = 0. We substitute the
solution into the condition zLt = 0 in (6) to derive the range of 
L
t that is consistent with
the condition zLt = 0. We can also show that z
H
t > 0 holds in the current equilibrium.
The analysis thus far is summarized in the following lemma.
 Lemma 2. There exists a period-t political equilibrium with zLt = 0 and zHt > 0 if
Lt 2
 
0;

1  
1 + 
1=(1+)#
:
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The corresponding policy is
(t; t) =
8<:
 

1+
; 0

if Lt 2
h
1 
1+
;
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)i
;
1
2
(1  Lt ); (1 + )  21 Lt

if Lt <
1 
1+
:
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
The condition in Lemma 2, Lt 2

0;
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)i
, implies that the type-Ls income
level is too low to pay for private education. Because of this negative income e¤ect on
private education, they prefer public education to private education regardless of the
relative e¢ ciency of private education. Therefore, they choose et > 0 for voting and
zLt = 0 for economic decisions.
The remaining condition determines the type-Ls preferences for lump-sum transfer.
First, consider the case in which the type-Ls income level is moderately high: Lt 2h
1 
1+
;
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)i
. In this case, they feel no need for government support via lump-sum
transfer, and nd it optimal to use all the tax revenue for public education. Therefore,
they choose a set of policies distinguished by no provision of lump-sum transfer. The
corresponding policy is (t; t) =
 

1+
; 0

, as demonstrated in Panel (a) of Figure 3.
Alternatively, consider the case in which the type-Ls income level is too low such that
Lt <
1 
1+
holds. Because of their very low income level, the type-L agents feel the need
for support via lump-sum transfer. However, this support is not enough to nance private
education; they also need support for public education. Therefore, they choose a set of
policies including the provision of both public education and lump-sum transfer. The
corresponding policy is (t; t) =

1
2
(1  Lt ); (1 + )  21 Lt

, as demonstrated in Panel
(b) of Figure 3.
3.3 Period-t Political Equilibrium
With the use of the results in Lemmas 1 and 2, we are now able to show the period-t
political equilibrium policy for a given Lt .
Proposition 1. The period-t political equilibrium policy is given as follows:
(t; t) =
8>><>>:

1
2
(1  Lt ); (1 + )  21 Lt

if 0 < Lt <
1 
1+
; 

1+
; 0

if 1 
1+
 Lt 
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)
;
1
2

1   Lt 1+ ; 0 if  1 1+1=(1+) < Lt < 1:
Proposition 1 states that the economy attains an equilibrium distinguished by the
provision of both public education and lump-sum transfer when inequality is high such
that Lt < (1 )=(1+); it attains an equilibrium distinguished by the provision of public
education only when inequality is low such that Lt  (1  )=(1 + ). The result implies
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that the model shows a positive correlation between inequality and the ratio of lump-sum
transfer to public education. This correlation is in line with the empirical evidence in
OECD countries depicted in Figure 1.
To understand the mechanism behind the result, let us recall the type-Ls human
capital production function given by
hLt+1 = A
L
 
ht
  et +  Lt  zLt  :
For type-L agents, one unit of investment in public education produces a better return
than that in private education because
 
Lt

< 1 holds. Thus, type-L agents prefer public
education to private one from the viewpoint of optimality.
The preferences for the lump-sum transfer bt and the corresponding economic decision
on private investment in education zLt are not straightforward; they are dependent on the
inequality represented by Lt . When the inequality is low such that
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)
< Lt < 1;
type-L agents are endowed with moderately high income, they can a¤ord to invest in
private education and thus choose zLt > 0 from the viewpoint of utility maximization.
In contrast, when the inequality is moderate such that 1 
1+
 Lt 
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)
, type-L
agents are endowed with moderately low income and cannot a¤ord the expense of spending
in private education; they choose zLt = 0. In both cases, the type-L agents have certain
level of income for consumption, and therefore, there is no need to require lump-sum
transfer. They prefer public education to lump-sum transfer and thus choose bt = 0 (i.e.,
t = 0).
Finally, consider the case where the type-Ls income level is considerably lower such
that 0 < Lt <
1 
1+
. Type-L agents choose zLt = 0 because of their low income level. Given
zLt = 0, the type-Ls problem for choosing t becomes
max
t
ln(1  t) + (1  ) ln
 
Lt + tt

+  ln (1  t) t:
The second term corresponds to the utility of consumption, which is dependent on Lt ;
and the third term corresponds to the utility of public education via the human capi-
tal production function, which is independent of Lt . As observed in the second term,
the marginal utility of lump-sum transfer becomes larger as Lt becomes lower. This in-
centivizes the type-L agents to choose lump-sum transfer. Therefore, the type-L agents
choose et > 0 and bt > 0 in voting for this case.
Notice that the two sorts of equilibria, demonstrated in the present model, come from
the external e¤ect of parents human capital associated with private education. This
e¤ect is observed by the term
 
Lt

in the type-Ls human capital production function,
hLt+1 = A
L
 
ht
  et +  Lt  zLt . If the e¤ect is removed from the model, we fail to
demonstrate the two types of empirically relevant equilibria. This point is discussed more
in detail in Section 5.
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4 Steady-state Equilibrium
The characterization of the period-t political equilibrium enables us to clarify the role of
inequality in the determination of redistribution policy and to provide empirically relevant
results. However, it does not deal with the mutual interaction between inequality and
redistribution policy because inequality is considered given. To illustrate the interaction
and to explore its implication, we here demonstrate a motion of inequality across periods,
and characterize a steady-state equilibrium in which Lt = 
L
t+1 holds along the equilibrium
path. Based on this characterization, we examine how the structural parameters  and
, representing family background e¤ects, a¤ect the determination of the steady-state
inequality and redistribution policy. We then discuss the implication of the results.
We substitute private educational investment and equilibrium policy into the human
capital production function, hit+1 = A
i
 
ht
  et + (it) zit, and obtain the period-t + 1
human capital, hit+1, as a function of ht and h
i
t, as follows:
hLt+1 = h
L
 
ht; h
L
t

;hHt+1 = h
H
 
ht; h
H
t

:
Given the denition of the average human capital, ht+1 = LhLt+1 + 
HhHt+1, we can write
ht+1 as a function of ht, hLt , and h
H
t as follows:
ht+1 = 
LhL
 
ht; h
L
t

+ HhH
 
ht; h
H
t

:
Therefore, the period-t+ 1 measure of inequality, Lt+1, becomes
Lt+1 
hLt+1
ht+1
=
hL
 
ht; h
L
t

LhL
 
ht; hLt

+ HhH
 
ht; hHt
 :
After some calculations, we obtain the following law of motion of Lt (see Appendix
A.2 for the derivation):
Lt+1 = ~
i
 
Lt ; 
H
t
  
L+ H  !i (Lt ; Ht )
; i = 1; 2; 3; (7)
where !i
 
Lt ; 
H
t

= hHt+1=h
L
t+1. The function !i (; ) is dened by
!i
 
Lt ; 
H
t

=
8>>><>>>:
!1
 
Lt ; 
H
t
   + (1 ) (1+)Lt +2Ht
1+Lt
  Ht  if 0 < Lt < 1 1+ ;
!2
 
Lt ; 
H
t
   + (1 + )   Ht  if 1 1+  Lt   1 1+1=(1+) ;
!3
 
Lt ; 
H
t
  1 (Lt )1++2(Ht )1+
1+(Lt )
1+ if
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)
< Lt < 1,
where LLt + 
HHt = 1; that is,
Ht = 
H
 
Lt
  1
H
(1  LLt ):
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Let us denote ~
i
 
Lt ; 
H
t

= ~
i
 
Lt ; 
H
 
Lt
  
i  Lt  : Then, given an initial condi-
tion, L0 (> 0), the equilibrium sequence

Lt
	
is represented by the rst-order di¤erence
equation, Lt+1 = 

 
Lt

; where


 
Lt

=
8><>:

1
 
Lt

if 0 < Lt <
1 
1+
;

2
 
Lt

if 1 
1+
 Lt 
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)
;

3
 
Lt

if
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)
< Lt < 1:
The function
 () has the following property: 
1 (0) 2 (0; 1);
3 (0) 2 (0; 1); @
i () =@Lt >
0 (i = 1; 2; 3), 
1
 
1 
1+

= 
2
 
1 
1+

and 
2
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)
= 
3
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)
. Therefore,
we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique and stable steady-state equilibrium with L 2
(0; 1).
Having established the existence of a unique and stable steady-state equilibrium, we
now investigate the e¤ect of family background, represented by the parameters  and ,
on the determination of steady-state inequality and policy. Figure 3 illustrates numerical
examples of the equation. In Panel (a), we set  = 0:5; L = 0:6 and  = 0:25, and
illustrate three cases,  = 0:6; 0:75 and 0:9. The gure shows that the economy attains
a high-inequality steady state with government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer
when  = 0:6, while it attains a low-inequality steady state with government expenditure
favoring public education when  = 0:75 and 0:9.
[Figure 4 here.]
To understand the role of  more precisely, consider rst the case of a low , that is,
 = 0:6. A low  implies that the type-L agents su¤er from low productivity of human
capital investment. Given this, the type-L agents expect a low rate of return of private
and public education, which gives them a disincentive to pay for private education, and
to choose lump-sum transfer rather than public education. Then, the economy realizes
a high-inequality equilibrium with government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer.
The opposite result holds when  is high such that  = 0:75 and 0:9.
In Panel (b), we x  at 0:75 and focus on the parameter  for three cases:  = 0:05; 0:3
and 0:55: The gure shows that the economy attains a high-inequality steady state with
government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer when  = 0:55, while it attains a
low-inequality steady state with government expenditure favoring public education when
 = 0:3 and 0:05. A lower  implies less external e¤ect of parental human capital on
the childs human capital formation and thus narrows the gap between the two classes
via human capital accumulation. Therefore, the economy is more likely to attain a less
unequal state as  becomes lower.
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In summary, the present numerical investigation suggests that the economy with the
weaker family background e¤ect attains a more equal state with government expenditure
favoring public education, and the economy with the stronger family background e¤ect
attains a less equal state with government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer. This
model prediction should be viewed with caution because it depends on the present model
specication. However, it provides a hypothesis about the cross-country di¤erence in
inequality and redistribution policies, which should be tested in future research.
5 Discussion and Extension
The result established so far depends on the assumption of the external e¤ect of parents
human capital on the productivity of private education. The result also depends on the
assumption of the type-L majority and on the specication of the logarithmic utility
function. In this section, we briey consider the role of each assumption, and investigate
how the result would change if either of them is relaxed or modied.
5.1 External E¤ect of Human Capital
The present model assumes that the average human capital ht a¤ects the marginal pro-
ductivity of public education. The model also assumes that the parentshuman capital
hit a¤ects the marginal productivity of private education. When  is set to be zero, these
e¤ects vanish in the human capital formation; the human capital production function is
reduced to
hit+1 = A
i  et + zit ;
which is similar to that in Gradstein and Justman (1996).
Given this reduced form of the function, the preferences of a type-L agents are repre-
sented by the following indirect utility function:
V Lt =
8>>>><>>>>:
V Lt;z>0  ln (1  t)

Lt + tt + (1  t) t

if t >

1 

  Lt
t

  1 + 1 

 1
;
V it;z=0  ln(1  t) + (1  ) ln
 
Lt + tt

+  ln (1  t) t
if t 

1 

  Lt
t

  1 + 1 

 1
:
By comparing Eq. (3) with the above equation, we nd that when zL = 0, the
preferences are not a¤ected by the presence or the absence of the external e¤ects of
human capital. The result in Lemma 2 is applicable to the present case. However, the
external e¤ects of human capital matter when zL > 0. Lump-sum transfer and public
education are perfect substitutes in the absence of the external e¤ects, as we can see in
the above expression of V Lt;z>0. In other words, they are indi¤erent for the type-L agents
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from the viewpoint of utility maximization. Therefore, the allocation of tax revenue, t,
becomes indeterminate, which makes sharp prediction di¢ cult. The assumption of the
external e¤ects is one of the ways to resolve the problem of indeterminacy.
5.2 Type-H Majority
In the main body of the paper, we have conducted the analysis by assuming type-L ma-
jority. This assumption reects the right-skewed income distribution in the real economy.
However, readers may wonder how the result would change when the type-H agents are
the majority. Following the same procedure as in the case of the type-L majority, we can
characterize the type-H majority political equilibrium and obtain the following result:
there is no provision of public education and lump-sum transfer when the type-H agents
are the majority (see Appendix A.3 for the proof).
To understand the statement, recall the type-Hs human capital production function
given by
hHt+1 = A
H
 
ht
  et +  Ht  zHt  :
The return from investment is higher in private education than in public education because 
Ht

> 1 holds. Because of this property, the type-H agents have no incentive to allocate
the tax revenue to public education. In addition, the type-H agents obtain no benet
from the lump-sum transfer because it is a redistribution from the type-H agents to the
type-L agents. Therefore, the type-H agents prefer no provision of both public education
and lump-sum transfer, and choose no taxation as a decisive voter.
5.3 A Constant Elasticity-of-Substitution Utility Function
At this point, we have conducted the analysis by assuming a logarithmic utility function.
This specication makes the analysis tractable, but results in a private investment function
that is independent of the productivity of human capital, Ai, the average human capital,
ht, and other parameters. This subsection introduces a constant elasticity-of-substitution
utility function to resolve this problem. This subsection demonstrates that the result is
qualitatively unchanged even if we generalize the utility function.
Consider the following utility function:
U it = (1  )
(cit)
1    1
1   + 
 
hit+1
1    1
1   ; (8)
where  > 1 and  6= 1 hold.4 When agentspreferences are specied by this utility
4The function becomes the logarithmic utility function U it = (1  ) ln cit +  lnhit+1 if  ! 1.
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function, the period-t political equilibrium policy is given by
(t; t) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0@1
2
 
1  Lt

;
1 


1  (AL)
1 
(ht)
(1 )
1=
2Lt
1 Lt
1+


1  (A
L)1 (ht)
(1 )
1=
1A if Lt < ~Lt  ht; AL 
^
 
Lt ;
ht;A
L

; 0

if ~Lt
 
ht; A
L
  Lt  ^Lt  ht; AL
1
2

1   Lt 1+ ; 0 if ^Lt  ht; AL < Lt ;
where ^
 
Lt ;
ht;A
L

satises (1   )  Lt 1  =   AL1   ht(1 ) (t)  (1  2t), and
~Lt
 
ht; A
L

and ^Lt
 
ht; A
L

denote the critical values of Lt that satisfy
Lt =
"
1 + 2


1  
 
AL
1   ht(1 )1=# 1 ;
and
1 =
 
Lt
1+
+ 2


1  
1=  
AL
(1 )=  ht(1 )=  Lt =+1 ;
respectively. The proof of the statement here is provided in Appendix A.4.
The result described thus far indicates that the critical value of Lt depends on the av-
erage human capital, ht, and the type-Ls human capital productivity, AL. This property
is not observed in the logarithmic utility function case as demonstrated in Proposition 1.
However, the equilibrium redistributive policy established here is qualitatively equivalent
to that in Proposition 1. There is a provision of both public education and lump-sum
transfer when inequality is high, while there is no provision of lump-sum transfer when
inequality is low.
The reason for this equivalence lies in the fact that there is no intertemporal deci-
sion making on savings in the present model. In other words, there is no substitution
e¤ect through the interest rate, which may dominate the income e¤ect, depending on
the elasticity of substitution. Given this lack of the substitution e¤ect, we have found
that the generalization of the utility function does not qualitatively a¤ect the choice of
redistribution policy through voting.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a theoretical framework that studies the voting on public
education and lump-sum transfer in an overlapping generations model with two types of
family dynasties classied according to their endowed level of human capital. In doing
this, we have argued that the marginal productivity of private education increases with
the parents human capital level, and this family background e¤ect inuences agents
preferences for the two redistribution policies.
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Our model predicts that a higher (lower) inequality is associated with the government
expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer (public education). In other words, there is a pos-
itive correlation between inequality and the ratio of lump-sum transfer to public education.
This model prediction is in line with the empirical evidence observed in OECD countries.
To illustrate the source of this correlation, we focus on the family background e¤ect. We
show that the economy with stronger (weaker) family background e¤ect attains a less
(more) equal state with the government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer (public
education).
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.
As demonstrated in Figure 2, two cases should be considered: (a) the case of 
1+
 
1 
L
t ,
that is, (1 )=(1+)  Lt and (b) the case of 1+ > 1 Lt , that is, (1 )=(1+) > Lt :
In case (a), there are two possible solutions: one characterized by no redistribution
with t = 0, and the other characterized by some redistribution with t > 0. They are
given by
(t; t) =


1 + 
; 0

and

^t; ^t

where ^t > 0:
By direct calculation, we nd that the former solution, (=(1 + ); 0), satises the zLt = 0
condition if Lt  ((1  )=(1 + ))1=(1+).
The latter solution,

^t; ^t

, does not satisfy the zLt = 0 condition. To prove this
argument, suppose that

^t; ^t

is available in equilibrium in the case of (1   )=(1 +
)  Lt . The curve representing the reaction function t = Lz=0(t) crosses the curve
representing the reaction function t = Lz=0(t) twice within the range t 2
 

1 
L
t ;
1
2

.
That is, the following condition holds for some t 2
 

1 
L
t ;
1
2

:
(1 + )  =t
1  2t 
L
t < (1  ) 
Lt
t
:
The condition is rewritten as follows:
Lt < 1  2t for some t 2


1  
L
t ;
1
2

;
or
Lt <
1  
1 + 
:
This contradicts the presumption of (1  )=(1 + )  Lt . Therefore, there is no solution
with t > 0 when (1  )=(1 + )  Lt holds.
The analysis thus far indicates that the solution is limited to (t; t) = (=(1 + ); 0)
when (1   )=(1 + )  Lt . We substitute this solution into the condition zLt = 0 in
(6) and nd that zLt = 0 holds if and only if 
L
t  ((1  )=(1 + ))1=(1+). That is, the
solution (t; t) = (=(1 + ); 0) is realized as an equilibrium if (1   )=(1 + )  Lt 
((1  )=(1 + ))1=(1+).
In case (b), the solution is interior as illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 2. By direct
calculation, we obtain
(t; t) =

1
2
(1  Lt ); (1 + ) 
2
1  Lt

:
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We substitute this solution into the condition zLt = 0 in (6) and nd that z
L
t = 0 holds if
Lt  1.
Finally, we show that zHt > 0 holds for both cases. With the use of (2), we have
zHt > 0, t >
1
1 + 1 

 1
(Ht )



1  

 1
(Ht )
   
H
t
t

:
Suppose that (1 )=(1+)  Lt holds. We substitute the solution (t; t) = (=(1 + ); 0)
into the above condition and obtain
1  
1 + 
1=(1+)
< Ht ;
which holds for any Ht because the left-hand side is less than one and the right-hand side
is greater than one by the denition of Ht .
Alternatively, suppose that Lt < (1   )=(1 + ) holds. We substitute the solution
(t; t) =
 
1
2
(1  Lt ); (1 + )  2=(1  Lt )

into the zHt > 0 condition. After some calcu-
lation, we obtain
zHt > 0, (1  )

1  1
(Ht )

 
1 + Lt

+ 2
 
Ht   Lt

> 0;
which holds for any Ht (> 1) and 
L
t (< 1).
A.2 Derivation of (7)
To derive Eq. (7), recall that the average human capital in period t + 1, ht+1, is dened
by
ht+1  LhLt+1 + HhHt+1:
With the denition of Lt+1  hLt+1=ht+1, we have
Lt+1 =
hLt+1
LhLt+1 + 
HhHt+1
=

L+ H
hHt+1
hLt+1
:
The next task is to compute    hHt+1=hLt+1. With the use of the results in Lemmas 1
and 2, we can write hHt+1 and h
L
t+1 as follows:
hHt+1 =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1
4
A   1 + Lt    ht1+

h
(1  )  (1 + )Lt
	  
Ht

+ 
 
1 + Lt

+ 2
 
Ht
1+i if Lt < 1 1+ ;
A 
1+
  ht1+  h 1+ +  Ht 1+i if 1 1+  Lt   1 1+1=(1+) ;
1
4
A   ht1+  1 +  Lt 1+  1   Lt 1+ + 2  Ht 1+ if  1 1+1=(1+) < Lt ;
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and
hLt+1 =
8>><>>:
1
4
A   1 + Lt 2   ht1+ if Lt < 1 1+ ;
A  
(1+)2
  ht1+ if 1 1+  Lt   1 1+1=(1+) ;
1
4
A   ht1+  1 +  Lt 1+2 if  1 1+1=(1+) < Lt :
Therefore,    hHt+1=hLt+1 is given by

hHt+1
hLt+1
=
8>>><>>>:
!1
 
Lt ; 
H
t
   + (1 ) (1+)Lt +2Ht
1+Lt
 
Ht

if Lt <
1 
1+
;
!2
 
Lt ; 
H
t
   + (1 + )  Ht 1+ if 1 1+  Lt   1 1+1=(1+) ;
!3
 
Lt ; 
H
t
  1 (Lt )1++2(Ht )1+
1+(Lt )
1+ if
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)
< Lt :
A.3 The Type-H Majority
First, suppose that zHt > 0 holds. The type-Hs indirect utility function when z
H
t > 0 is
V Ht;z>0 = ln(1  t) 

Ht + tt +
1
(Ht )
 (1  t) t

+Xz>0
 
ht; 
H
t

:
The rst-order conditions with respect to t and t are as follows:
@V Ht;z>0
@t

t=0
=  1 + 1
Ht


t +
1  t
(Ht )


< 0;
@V Ht;z>0
@t
=
t
 
1  1=  Ht 
Ht + tt + (1  t) t= (Ht )
> 0:
These conditions imply that (t; t) = (0; 1) holds for any Ht > 0. Plugging this pair of
policy into the condition of zHt > 0, we obtain
zHt > 0, 1 >
1 

 1
(Ht )
   Htt
1 + 1 

 1
(Ht )

=  1;
which holds for any Ht > 0. Given that t = 0, there is no tax revenue and thus no
provision of public education and lump-sum transfer.
Next, suppose that zHt = 0 holds. The type-Hs indirect utility function when z
H
t = 0
is
V Ht;z=0 = ln(1  t) + (1  ) ln
 
Ht + tt

+  ln (1  t) t:
We solve the problem of maximizing V Ht;z=0 to obtain the following reaction functions:
t = 
H
z=0 (t), t =
1 +    =t
1  2t 
H
t ;
t = 
H
z=0 (t)  max

0; (1  )  
H
t
t

:
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These reaction functions coincide with those in the case of type-L majority if we replace
Ht with 
L
t : We can apply the analysis in Section 3.2. The possible solutions are
(t; t) =
8<:
 

1+
; 0

if Ht 2
h
1 
1+
;
 
1 
1+
1=(1+)i
1
2
 
1  Ht

; (1 + )  2
1 Ht

if Ht <
1 
1+
:
However, the solution is not feasible because it requires Ht < 1, which contradicts the
presumption of Ht > 1. Therefore, there is no feasible policy when z
H
t = 0.
A.4 A Constant Elasticity-of-Substitution Utility Function
Consider the following utility function:
U it = (1  )
(cit)
1    1
1   + 
 
hit+1
1    1
1   ;
where  > 1 and  6= 1 hold. We compute the type-Ls indirect utility function as follows:
V Lt =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
V Lt;z>0  11 z>0(Lt ; ht) (1  t)1 
 
Lt + tt
  
Lt

+ (1  t) t
1    1
1 
if t > 
 
t; 
L
t

;
V Lt;z=0  11 
 
ht
1 
(1  t)1 

h
(1  )  Lt + tt1  +   AL1   ht(1 ) ((1  t) t)1 i  11 
if t  
 
t; 
L
t

;
where 
 
t; 
L
t

is dened as follows:

 
t; 
L
t
  1    1 1=  AL(1 )=  ht(1 )=  Lt =+1 (1=t)
1 +
 

1 
1=
(AL)(1 )=
 
ht
(1 )=
(Lt )
=
;
and the term z>0(Lt ; ht) includes 
L
t and ht and other unrelated terms.
5
Suppose that zLt > 0 holds, that is, t > 
 
t; 
L
t

holds. The rst-order condition
with respect to t leads to the following reaction function of t for a given t:
t = 
L
z>0 (t) 
1
2
"
1 
 
Lt
1+
t (Lt )

+ (1  t)
#
:
5The term z>0(Lt ; ht) is dened as follows:
z>0(
L
t ;
ht) 
264 ht 
Lt

+


1 
1=
(AL)
(1 )=  ht(1 )=  Lt =
375
1 
  ht1 

24(1  ) +   AL1   ht(1 )( 
1  
1=  
AL
(1 )=  ht(1 )=  Lt =
)1 35 :
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The di¤erentiation of V Lt;z>0 with respect to t is
1
z>0(Lt ; ht) (1  t)1 
 @V
L
t;z>0
@t
=
 
Lt + tt
  
Lt

+ (1  t) t
 
t
  
Lt
   1 < 0:
This condition implies that t = 08Lt :We substitute t = 0 into t = Lz>0 (t) and obtain
t =

1   Lt 1+ =2:
The solution (t; t) =

1   Lt 1+ =2; 0 is feasible if it satises the condition
of zLt > 0, that is, t > 
 
t; 
L
t

. We substitute the solution into the condition t >

 
t; 
L
t

and rearrange the terms to obtain
1 <
 
Lt
1+
+ 2


1  
1=  
AL
(1 )=  ht(1 )=  Lt =+1 ;
where the right-hand side is increasing in Lt . Therefore, there exists a critical value of
Lt , denoted by ^
L
t
 
ht; A
L

, such that zLt > 0 holds at (t; t) =

1   Lt 1+ =2; 0 if
^Lt
 
ht; A
L

< Lt holds.
Next, suppose that zLt = 0 holds, that is, t  
 
t; 
L
t

holds. The rst-order
condition with respect to t is
(1  )  Lt + tt  Lt   t(1  2t) (9)
= 
 
AL
1   ht(1 ) ((1  t) t)  (1  t) (1  2t) :
The rst-order condition with respect to t is
(1  )  Lt + tt  =   AL1   ht(1 ) ((1  t) t)  : (10)
Taking account of a corner solution, we obtain the following reaction function of t:
t = 
L
z=0 (t)  max
8><>:0;
1 
n

1 
 
AL
1   ht(1 )o1= Ltt
1 +
n

1  (A
L)1 
 
ht
(1 )o1=
9>=>; : (11)
Suppose that t > 0 holds in (11). With the use of (9) and (10), we obtain
(t; t) =
0B@1
2
 
1  Lt

;
1 
n

1 
 
AL
1   ht(1 )o1= 2Lt1 Lt
1 +
n

1  (A
L)1 
 
ht
(1 )o1=
1CA :
Therefore, t > 0 holds if and only if 1 
n

1 
 
AL
1   ht(1 )o1= 2Lt1 Lt > 0; that is,
Lt < ~
L
t
 
ht; A
L
  "1 + 2 
1  
 
AL
1   ht(1 )1=# 1 :
Alternatively, suppose that t = 0 holds. This case holds for Lt 2

^Lt
 
ht; A
L

; ~Lt
 
ht; A
L

:
Substituting t = 0 into (9), we nd that the solution of t, denoted by ^
 
Lt ;
ht;A
L

;
satises (1  )  Lt 1  =   AL1   ht(1 ) (t)  (1  2t).
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Figure 1: The gure illustrates the scatter plot of Gini coecients in 2010 and the ratio
of in-cash transfer to public education expenditure in 2009 for OECD countries. Public
education expenditure includes primary and secondary education in Panel (a), and pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary education in Panel (b).
Source: Social Expenditure Database (www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure), Decem-
ber 2013; OECD Education Database, 2013, and Eurostat Education Database, 2013;
OECD Income Distribution Database (via www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-
database.htm)
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?Figure 2: Type-L's reaction functions when zLt > 0.
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? ?
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Figure 3: Type-L's reaction functions when zLt = 0. Panel (a) illustrates the case of
Lt  1 1+ ; Panel (b) illustrates the case of Lt < 1 1+ .
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Figure 4: The gure illustrates the graph of Lt+1 = 

 
Lt

. We set  = 0:5 and L = 0:6.
In Panel (a), we x  at 0:25; and illustrate three cases,  = 0:6; 0:75; and 0:9. In Panel
(b), we x  at 0:75 and illustrate three cases,  = 0:05; 0:3; and 0:55.
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